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Ben W. Heineman, Jr.t
Moderate, swing vote, pithy and witty writer-these were the charac-
teristics of Potter Stewart seen by the public.
What was harder to see-because Justice Stewart was a modest and
self-effacing man not given to theorizing in his opinions-was his shrewd
and sophisticated view of the Supreme Court and the way constitutional
law is, and should be, made.
In essence, Justice Stewart used a "common law" approach to the great
open-ended guarantees of the Constitution: due process, equal protection,
freedom of speech and press. These guarantees are not self-executing and,
according to most scholars and jurists, must be adapted to a modern soci-
ety. Yet that still leaves the great puzzle of judicial review: when is it
appropriate for the Supreme Court to invoke the Constitution in invali-
dating laws enacted by federal or state legislatures?
Justice Stewart believed deeply in history and in precedent. Yet he rec-
ognized that neither may have complete answers to contemporary consti-
tutional issues. He was an advocate neither of strict judicial restraint nor
inveterate judicial activism. He was neither a strict constructionist nor a
loose constructionist. He was neither a conservative nor a liberal. To him,
those labels implied an approach to constitutional decision making which
was wrong-imposition of a rigid set of personal beliefs on the specifics of
each case.
For Justice Stewart, the solution to the riddle of judicial review under
the great open-ended constitutional guarantees was a "common law" ap-proach in which principles emerged slowly and organically from the facts
of each case. Cases should, as a general matter, be decided narrowly, and
broader principles should emerge only as precedents accumulated.
In deciding individual cases on the facts, Justice Stewart thought it cru-
cial to find an appropriate balance between the competing constitutional
values at issue. The Court, in his view, could not go far wrong if it stayed
close to the particular controversy presented and reached a sensible bal-
ance between the legitimate values in conflict.
For Justice Stewart, this approach stemmed from two fundamental be-
liefs. First, as a person of the world who had served in war, practiced law,
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and been an elected official (and whose father had been a prominent Ohio
politician), he knew that economic and social reality was far more com-
plex than judicial rules. In deciding individual cases on the record
presented by the parties, the Supreme Court is often ill-equipped to an-
nounce broad prescriptions, because, necessarily, it does not have access to
a broad set of "legislative" facts.
Justice Stewart also believed, however, that the Supreme Court's fun-
damental role was to be a balance wheel in American society. He was
enough of a politician not to extol in unrealistic measure the virtues of city
councils or state legislatures or, for that matter, the Congress of the
United States. The Court sat to ensure a crucial degree of balance be-
tween majority rule and minority rights, between Congressional and Pres-
idential power, between federal authority and state and local autonomy,
between robust public debate under the First Amendment and necessary
governmental order.
Is it any surprise then that Justice Stewart was himself a balance wheel
on the Court? Take the abortion issue. Justice Stewart, along with Justice
Hugo Black, dissented from the Court's seminal case establishing a right
to privacy, Griswold v. Connecticut,' because he could find no such right
in the Constitution. Yet, once the Court had found such a right, he ac-
cepted that doctrine and applied it in Roe v. Wade,
2 joining the Court in
holding that the constitutional privacy guarantee encompassed a woman's
right to decide whether or not to terminate her pregnancy. But in Harris
v. McRae,3 Justice Stewart wrote for the Court that, while a right to an
abortion existed, there was no right to have the government pay for the
procedure, the constitutional right did not create an entitlement to public
funding. Whether or not one agrees with Justice Stewart's opinions in
these three cases, they are all models of lucidity that reflect a careful bal-
ance between past precedent and present realities, between individual
rights and important governmental concerns.
Despite the attention given to the Black-Frankfurter debates of the
1950's, when Justice Stewart began his service on the Court, or to the
"liberal-conservative" debates which marked his last decade on the Court
in the 1970's, an argument could be made that the "common law" ap-
proach of Justice Stewart has been a dominant, perhaps the dominant,
method of constitutional decision making in the last quarter century.
On the day Justice Stewart died, a friend said to me: "Great judge,
good Justice." Yes and no. Great judge, great Justice. He was a man of
extraordinary intelligence and wisdom who, along with a colleague whom
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he revered, John Marshall Harlan, was the exemplar of an important
Supreme Court tradition. Because that tradition cannot be easily summa-
rized, it is easily overlooked. But the Stewart approach will endure.
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